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JOEL MICHAEL REYNOLDS
MERLEAU-PONTY, WORLD-CREATING BLINDNESS,  
AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF NON-NORMATE BODIES
Limiting a field to those who live similar lives diminishes 
its truth and usefulness, yielding at best partial truths, at worst 
distortions of central concepts.
Eva Kittay1 
There is no hierarchy of orders or layers or planes…there is 
dimensionality of every fact (dimensionnalité de tout fait) and 
facticity of every dimension (facticité de toute dimension) — This 
in virtue of the “ontological difference”. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty2
At the mythic origins of the Western philosophical canon, awaiting the 
peristalsis of hemlock that would consummate his juried execution, Socrates 
asks, “Is life worth living with a body that is corrupted and in a bad condition 
(mochtherou kai diephtharmenou somatos)?”3 “In no way (oudamōs),” replies 
Crito.4 This corrupted, bad body has historically been correlated to what we, 
for only the last two centuries, term ‘disability’ in English.5 With just a single 
word, Crito affirms Socrates’s uncritical treatment of a vast and nebulous 
range of corporeal differences as if they constituted a monolith, as if a uniform 
corporeal set fashioning lives in lockstep. And that form is further rendered 
negative. It is assumed that bodies are capable of lack and ruination and that 
certain lacks and ruins lessen a body’s worth and the forms of life it might 
afford.6 Socrates’s error lies in preemptively grouping, judging, and foreclosing 
a multiplicity of embodied experiences.
Merleau-Ponty, in his early critiques of objectivism and intellectualism and 
across his oeuvre, consistently pushes against reductions of the body that fail 
to attend to the multiplicity of its always meaningful relations. Every bodily 
configuration is more than a compilation of anatomical and physical structures. 
The body is always a unit of meaning, an active producer of sense in contexts. 
As he put it in 1942, “the notion of a living body (corps vivant) could not be 
grasped without the unity of signification, which distinguishes a gesture from 
a sum of movements.”7 However, that unity of signification, that non-reducible 
holism of sense (sens), depends upon how one’s singular body is lived. For 
the body, as Beauvoir lithely puts it, is “our situation…our grasp on the world 
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and the outline for our projects.”8 Yet, our situations, grasps, and projects are 
all shaped by the facility or resistance our social context affords. And there is 
an argument to be made that the vast majority of contexts across history have 
been actively resistant, if not hostile, to most disabled bodies.
Historically, inside philosophy, inside thinking that takes itself to be 
philosophical, certain bodies have been (and still are) considered to render 
life less worth living or not worth living at all. The refrain “I’d rather be dead 
than disabled,” a refrain heard by people with disabilities and their families 
and allies all too often, has deep philosophic roots. These roots attest to the 
long-standing privileging of the able-body in philosophy—a privilege that has 
resulted in a historic marginalization of disability despite its fundamental role 
in human existence. But I would argue, as do an increasing number of scholars 
at the intersection of feminist philosophy, philosophy of disability, and critical 
disability studies, that such roots are giving way. 
These scholars often turn to Merleau-Ponty, as I do here, to develop 
phenomenologies of disability or of the “non-normate” body.9 Such studies 
buck the historical tendency of philosophers to merely employ disability 
as an example of deficiency or harm, a litmus test for normative theories, 
or an umbrella term for non-standard, non-normate bodily variation. By 
“normate,” I mean the exemplar or ideal figure of ableism: that form of life 
constituted by and assured through its participation in normality. Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson, who coined the term, defines it as “the veiled subject 
position of the cultural self, the figure outlined by the array of deviant others 
whose marked bodies shore up the normate’s boundaries. The term normate 
usefully designates the social figure through which people can represent 
themselves as definitive human beings.”10 The pair “normate/non-normate” 
thus better picks out the range and lived contexts of meanings captured by 
that of “ability/disability.” By fusing norms, values, and desires, the concept 
of the normate brings into relief the way in which categorization by ability is 
irreducibly social. Powers and histories are always at play in the constitution 
of any given ability or disability.
But what precisely does it mean to undertake phenomenological 
investigations of non-normate experiences? And what relationship does 
such inquiry have to phenomenology as well as to philosophy as a whole? In 
“Philosophy and Non-Philosophy since Hegel,” Merleau-Ponty defines “non-
philosophy” as a philosophy that does not split consciousness from nature, 
being from beings, body from mind, or subject from object—a philosophy 
so distinct from its canonical history that a “non-” or “a-” must prefix it.11 
The guiding concern of this paper is the relation of disability to philosophy 
and non-philosophy: the relation of the sens, the meaning and direction, of 
philosophy as judged and informed by the lived experiences of non-normate 
bodies.12 
I first argue that the problematic treatment or omission of disability within 
the history of philosophy and the phenomenological tradition in particular 
is due to the inheritance of what I call “the ableist conflation” of disability 
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with pain, suffering, and disadvantage. While a Merleau-Pontian-inspired 
phenomenology marks a promising starting point for thinking about embodied 
experience both normate and non-normate, I here draw a cautionary tale 
about how ableist assumptions, implicit or explicit, can easily undermine 
accounts of non-normate experience. I show that Merleau-Ponty’s famous 
reading of the blind man’s cane is problematic insofar as it omits the social 
dimensions of disabled experiences, misconstrues the radicality of blindness 
as a worldcreating disability, and operates via an able-bodied simulation that 
conflates object annexation or extension with incorporation. I then argue that if 
phenomenology is to become non-philosophy, as Merleau-Ponty once hoped, 
it must heed the insights of “crip” or non-normate phenomenology, which 
takes experiences of disability as its points of departure.
The Ableist Conflation
Across the history of philosophy, disability has been understood before all 
else as a lack or privation. For example, Aristotle writes, 
Blindness (tuphlotes) is a privation (steresis), but one is not blind at any and 
every age, but only if one has not sight at the age at which one would naturally 
have it. Similarly a thing suffers privation when it has not an attribute in those 
circumstances, or in that respect and in that relation and in that sense, in which it 
would naturally have it.—The violent taking away (biaia aphaeresis) of anything 
is called privation.13 
Agreeing with Aristotle, Kant claims, “infirmity (Schwäche) of the mind 
is just such a crippled state of mind, as infirmity of the body is a crippled 
state for the body. Infirmities are not hindrances of the powers of mind, but 
a lack.”14 Take as a final example Mill’s famous, if not infamous, judgment 
about happiness and satisfaction: “better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool 
satisfied.”15 One meaning of ‘fool,’ in late nineteenth-century English, is what 
would today be considered a type of intellectual disability. In that light, Mill’s 
claim could be read as a variation of Socrates’s rhetorical question.16 On a 
utilitarian calculus, a deficit or malformation of intelligence—even if it results 
in happiness—is qualitatively worse than not having that lack. 
Be it in the works of Aristotle, Kant, or Mill, conceptualizations of disability 
across the history of philosophy are underwritten by what I call the ableist 
conflation.17 The ableist conflation consists, at minimum, of the following claims:
{1} Disability is a lack or deprivation.
{2} Deprivation of potential goods is a harm.18 
{3} Harm causes or is a form of pain and suffering.
{4} Given 1-3, disability is coextensive with (weak version) or causes (strong 
version), pain and suffering.
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To be clear, I am not defending any of these claims or the many assumptions 
behind their operative terms; I am contending that claims of this sort are 
often linked together to support the ableist conflation of disability with pain, 
suffering, and disadvantage. But there is an enormous body of research across 
disability studies that demonstrates the ableist conflation to be misguided, 
if not flatly false, in a plethora of cases of disabled experience.19 Despite its 
empirical and reflective dubiousness, the ableist conflation, taken in this wide 
sense of picking out the contours of a habit of thought, has served as a bedrock 
for philosophical inquiry about disability. For philosophy to combat ableism, 
this bedrock must be destroyed.
Merleau-Ponty’s Cane
Merleau-Ponty refers to multiple types of disability in Phenomenology of 
Perception. I will first highlight one of the more sweeping claims he makes 
about disability in general, demonstrating how his treatment of disability 
vacillates between committing and undermining the ableist conflation. This 
claim comes at a crucial juncture, opening the concluding section, entitled 
“Freedom,” wherein the opposition between absolute freedom and absolute 
determinism is addressed:
[N]o causal relation can be conceived between the subject and his body, his 
world, or his society. […] [A]t the very moment that I turn toward myself to describe 
myself, I catch sight of an anonymous flow, an overall project in which “states of 
consciousness” do not yet exist, nor, a fortiori, do characteristics of any kind. I 
am for myself neither “jealous,” nor “curious,” nor “hunchbacked,” nor “a civil 
servant.” We are often amazed that the disabled person or the person suffering from 
a disease (l’infirme ou le malade) can bear their situation. But in their own eyes 
they are not disabled or dying (infirme ou mourant). […] Consciousness can never 
objectify itself as sick-consciousness or as disabled-consciousness (conscience-de-
malade ou conscience-d’infirme); and, even if the elderly man complains of his 
old age or the disabled person of his disability (l’infirme de son infirmité), they can 
only do so when they compare themselves to others or when they see themselves 
through the eyes of others, that is, when they adopt a statistical or an objective view 
of themselves.20
The amazement with which we, according to Merleau-Ponty, regard the 
situation of those deemed “disabled” is made possible by the ableist conflation. 
The non-disabled and non-diseased, he contends, are amazed when one who 
is disabled or diseased or both—the distinction is in this passage unclear—
bears their situation. Why? Because the latter is thought to be so harmed 
through lack or deprivation that even bearing such a situation is cause for 
astonishment. Merleau-Ponty assumes the ableist conflation and then uses it 
against itself, as it were, to undermine its reduction of a life to a particular, 
negative characteristic of lack.21 
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Arguing from the perspective of pure consciousness, Merleau-Ponty 
points out that consciousness is not itself aware of itself as determined in any 
way; on the contrary, that is a “second-order knowledge” (460/499). This is 
why consciousness can never objectify itself as sick-consciousness or any 
determinate X-consciousness. “Mineness” or what it is to be “myself” exceeds 
any discrete determinations. Nevertheless, objectification is indeed “the price 
we pay, without even thinking about it, for being in the world.” I am, in point 
of fact, “not free to ignore others,” because I am not a pure consciousness 
(459/497-98). Thus, the opposition between absolute freedom and determinism 
proves false. There is an imbrication, a gearing-in, a suffusion between the 
world and myself that renders me neither fully free, nor unfree.
But by the time Merleau-Ponty finishes elaborating a response to this 
opposition by claiming that “freedom makes the obstacles to freedom appear,” 
disability has disappeared as an example (464/502). If “freedom does not 
destroy our situation, but gears into it,” then is one not forced—at least in 
part—to see oneself comparatively and objectively (467/506)? What of 
disabled-consciousness (conscience-d’infirme) now? And is not such a form 
of gearing-in a constitutive, not accidental, part of one’s being? Does Merleau-
Ponty not ultimately reopen a space for the ableist conflation, for the view of 
disability as an ontological lack and as sharing the plane of pain and suffering? 
To answer these questions, I turn to the oft-quoted example of the “blind 
man’s cane” (le bâton de l’aveugle).22
Without any explicit calculation, a woman maintains a safe distance between 
the feather in her hat and objects that might damage it; she senses where the feather 
is, just as we sense where our hand is. If I possess the habit of driving a car, then 
I enter into a lane and see that “I can pass” without comparing the width of the 
lane to that of the fender[.] […] The hat and the automobile have ceased to be 
objects whose size and volume would be determined through a comparison with 
other objects. […] The blind man’s cane has ceased to be an object for him, it is no 
longer perceived for itself (Le bâton de l’aveugle a cessé d’être un objet pour lui, il 
n’est plus perçu pour lui-même); rather, the cane’s furthest point is transformed into 
a sensitive zone, it increases the scope and the radius of the act of touching and has 
become analogous to a gaze (144/178).
The cane is no longer an object for the “blind man,” but is part of his being. 
Setting aside the ambiguity here with respect to congenital blindness (since it 
is not obvious at what developmental point the cane would be or cease to be 
an object), what does it mean that it is not just any cane—not a walking cane 
or fighting cane, etc.—but a “blind man’s cane”? And what is actually meant 
by “blindness”? If one were congenitally blind, one might have learned how 
to use echolocation via mouth-clicks and footsteps to “see.”23 In such cases, 
one is obviously not blind in the sense of not being able to “see” the world 
around one, as the term “blindness” is often assumed to mean.24 Of the many 
questions one might (and should) raise about the deployment of blindness in 
this passage, I will focus on the following: what must Merleau-Ponty assume 
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about le bâton de l’aveugle to employ it analogously to the woman’s feathered 
hat and a person driving a car? And how do the examples of disability he 
deploys inform his claims about freedom, consciousness, and history?
Of central concern here is the extent to which Merleau-Ponty’s claims about 
the cane are based in an able-bodied simulation of blindness that does not 
recognize the difference introduced by disability in the example and, insofar 
as they are so based, misleadingly support the role of blindness in the analogy 
with the feather and car. For brevity’s sake, I will refer to this henceforth as the 
bodily habit analogy. I will argue that this analogy runs awry by 1) omitting the 
social dimensions of blindness, 2) misconstruing the radicality of blindness as 
a complete sensory-perceptual experience—what I will call a “worldcreating 
disability,” and 3) operating via what seems to be a simulation grounded not in 
experiences of blindness, but of ocular sightedness.
Firstly, note that the “blind man’s cane” can only function as Merleau-Ponty 
claims it does when others do not treat him as disabled. As the metonymy of 
“white-cane” for “blind person” demonstrates, the white-cane is often taken 
as an obvious, extrinsic sign of blindness as a “disability” in the logic of the 
ableist conflation. The cane makes one conspicuous, easily leading to the 
interruption of any number of one’s bodily and social habits. When the “blind 
man” encounters another who speaks loudly (conflating deafness with certain 
visible disabilities, as is woefully common) or who refuses service to him, the 
smooth incorporation of his cane is disrupted.25 When he cannot safely cross a 
street because of a lack of curb cuts or audible walk signals, that incorporation 
is also disrupted.
Secondly, the experience of blindness is a much more radical reconfiguration 
of existence than Merleau-Ponty imagines. He mistakenly suggests that when 
an able-bodied person pretends to be blind for long enough, the cane can still 
become incorporated “after some time.” 
In the exploration of objects, the length of the cane does not explicitly intervene 
nor act as a middle term: the blind man knows its length by the position of the 
objects, rather than the position of the objects through the cane’s length. […] If I 
want to become habituated to a cane, I try it out, I touch some objects and, after 
some time, I have it “in hand” (en main) [.] […] Habit expresses the power (le 
pouvoir) we have of dilating our being in the world, or of altering our existence 
through incorporating (annexant) new instruments. (144-45/178-79). 
Does the able-bodied person then have it “in hand” in the same way a blind 
person does? How much time is needed? I would counter that in the case 
of a sighted person simulating blindness the cane is not part of a process of 
incorporation; it is instead an annexation, to translate the French more literally. 
With some practice the sighted person can surely annex or appropriate a 
cane as a bodily extension, but I am not convinced that they can incorporate 
or integrate it. Following the arguments of Preester and Tsakiris, I would 
contend that Merleau-Ponty problematically vacillates between claims that 
support object-extension or object-annexation vs. total, worldly, embodied 
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incorporation.26 But it is precisely the latter that seems to be germane to blind 
experience vis-à-vis a cane and, a fortiori, the experiential conditions pertaining 
to a worldcreating form of disability. The bodily habit analogy seems to have 
misconstrued blindness in crucial ways.
For example, take the account of John Hull, who experienced late-onset 
blindness:
First I believed that blindness was when you couldn’t see because something 
had gone wrong with your eyes. Then I understood that blindness was a deprivation 
of knowledge for which alternative sources and kinds of knowledge would 
compensate. Gradually I came to see that blindness is a whole-body condition. It 
is not simply that your eyes have ceased to function; your whole body undergoes a 
profound transformation in its relationship to the world. Finally, I came to believe 
that blindness is a world-creating condition.27
Hull’s description moves from an understanding of blindness cast in the 
logic of the ableist conflation—blindness as lack and suffering, as something 
“gone wrong”—all the way to a positive, generative, and rich form of life, 
however different from the norm. Corporeal alteration does not entail 
corporeal degradation, his account suggests, even when the former occurs by 
definition, as it were, through loss. Hull had to not only become blind, but 
also shed his ableist assumptions about being blind; he had to both become 
blind and also abnegate ableism to experience blindness as worldcreating. 
Hull’s account suggests that becoming blind is a form of what L.A. Paul calls 
a “transformative experience,” an experience the epistemic position of which 
one simply cannot be in prior to having it.28
Thirdly, as many disability activists and critical disability studies scholars 
have argued, simulation exercises not only fail to “simulate” the experience in 
question, they are actively harmful by reinforcing misguided ableist prejudices.29 
As some who are blind have claimed and as neuroscientific evidence supports, 
blindness cannot be simulated by a sighted person because blindness is not 
a lack of sight, but a fundamental set of sensory-physical conditions for the 
creation of a world.30 How could one—through a discrete activity, much less a 
thought experiment—simulate the total, habituated, embodied conditions of an 
experience of the world?31 To be fair, Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly claim 
that the able-bodied person having the cane “in hand” is identical to a blind 
person’s use of the cane. It is not clear precisely how far Merleau-Ponty wishes 
to take the example of sighted cane use.
That being said, a sighted person will fail to experience blindness by simply 
wearing a blind-fold while walking around with a cane or imagining how such 
an object would be incorporated if one “could not see.” Blindness, when taken 
by the sighted as an object of contemplation and experimentation, is often 
conceived as a characteristic or quality, analytically separable, of a subject. 
One might retort that merely wearing a blindfold, upon critical reflection, 
is indeed an easy target. What about donning non-transparent sunglasses, 
acquiring a white-cane, and then trying to arrange transportation from one’s 
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home to, say, a grocery store or perhaps an art gallery, all along the way 
discovering how others respond or fail to respond? What about then heading 
to a local disability services office to be processed as disabled in a legal sense 
by one of the many bureaucracies of our late capital economies? Though better 
than unwitting blindfold exercises, I would counter that none of these will 
suffice to experience the type of world blindness creates as a world. In short, 
the disanalogy between the white-cane, the feather, and the car should cause 
phenomenologists serious pause about uncritical deployments of non-normate 
embodiment.
When discussing disability, Merleau-Ponty clearly works to avoid the 
Scylla of factical reduction and the Charybdis of aperspectival generalization. 
Yet insofar as Merleau-Ponty’s use of blindness (and other experiences of 
disability) is grounded in an able-bodied perspective and, a fortiori, the 
ableist conflation, his account goes astray. Granted, Merleau-Ponty’s aim in 
assuming what “the blind man knows” is primarily to glean insight about 
embodiment by looking to the proprioceptive incorporation of various 
objects. With a more sustained focus on the experience of blindness and 
with incorporation of writings by people who have experienced blindness 
firsthand, both congenital and non-congenital, much more would have been 
revealed about such embodiment, including the conditions and import of 
one’s socio-historical context and the constitutive role ableism plays therein. 
This is a question of how one applies a Merleau-Pontian phenomenological 
analysis and, more generally, how one combats ableism when engaging in 
phenomenological inquiry.
Non-Normate Non-Philosophy
White-canes are not easily incorporated in a world made inaccessible 
for so many bodies in so many ways due to the structural and ideological 
stigmatization and exclusion of what is marked as ‘disability,’ which is to 
say, in a world made and maintained for the normate. Insofar as the historical, 
cultural, and social cannot be split from the natural, biological, and individual, 
the historical traces of ableism and the ableist conflation cannot be erased from 
the form and materiality of the body. A successful crip phenomenology will 
always seek to bring such traces into relief. “Cripping” is here understood as a 
method of, first, exposing the able-bodied assumptions of a given conceptual 
terrain or methodology and, second, articulating a conceptual reconstruction of 
that terrain grounded in non-normate experience.32 
Across Merleau-Ponty’s corpus, the body in its lived immediacy takes on a 
role unprecedented in the history of philosophy, but, as feminist critics, among 
others, have argued, his thinking of bodily difference, of corporeal variation, 
did not go as far as his own philosophic commitments might have suggested. As 
I hope to have demonstrated above, philosophical inquiry performed outside 
of the parameters of the normate body provides a needed and generative 
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corrective to the philosophical binaries and reifications against which Merleau-
Ponty’s oeuvre is positioned—even if Merleau-Ponty himself did not fully 
plumb the depths of such inquiry. Despite Merleau-Ponty’s missteps regarding 
blindness, his work as a whole, specifically its radical rethinking of binaries 
such as history/nature or materiality/ideality and its relentless insistence on 
bringing all forms of knowledge to bear on the understanding of experience, 
provides a fecund method for non-normate phenomenology.33
Put differently, non-normate phenomenology constitutes a form of non-
philosophy insofar as it both assumes and generates a radical critique 
of the ontological attitude, which is to say, that attitude which posits a 
philosophically fundamental difference between being and beings and which, 
for the early Heidegger, draws an uncritical line between ontological and ontic 
determinations—bracketing questions of gender, sexuality, race, disability, or 
class under the domain of the latter. Non-normate phenomenology constitutes 
a form of non-philosophy through its insistence on the irreducible multiplicity 
of worlds created through the constitutive phylogenetic polymorphism and 
ontogenetic variability of human corporeality. There is, for such a method, no 
fundamental split between subject and object, body and mind, consciousness 
and nature, being and beings, or ability and disability. 
As Merleau-Ponty avers, “the problem of a philosophy which might be 
non-philosophy remains in toto as long as one thinks consciousness or ‘object’ 
[Gegenstand].”34 Of course, Merleau-Ponty is not interested in renouncing 
philosophy as such, but philosophy as it has historically understood itself. 
“Non-philosophy,” then, is a catachresis. It is to be heard as a return to or 
a new beginning of philosophy—less a return to philosophy proper, as if a 
question of propriety and struggle over the power of the name, and more a 
return to philosophy as experience or philosophy as authentically about and 
of the world—philosophy as founded, constituted, and de(con)structed by 
experience. Because of the historical entrenchment of the ableist conflation, 
experiences of disability, of the multiplicity of non-normate experiences, are 
uniquely situated to unsettle philosophical inquiry that would take itself to be 
separate from its object. Inquiry performed vis-à-vis the non-normate body is 
non-philosophy, then, in multiple senses. It is so in the sense of being a theme 
historically judged unworthy of philosophical inquiry (if not of living), and 
it is so in the sense of resisting philosophy’s historical pretensions toward 
reification and its predilection for founding thought in binarity.35 
The phenomenon of “blindness” tells us much more about the body than 
about how objects become part of somatic habituation or about the multi-
modality of perception as a function of the intertwining of sense and sensibility, 
of the invisible and visible. It fundamentally upends and problematizes how we 
think of “ability,” which I take to be an ultimate and still undertheorized term 
for the power when subject and object meet. Non-normate phenomenology, 
then, performs non-philosophy through ex-posing the ineliminable imbrication 
of subject and object, body and mind, consciousness and nature, etc. Despite 
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operating in the order of reasons, non-normate phenomenology, where 
successful, inscribes the fusion of nature and history in experience. 
Despite canonically frequent deployments as a trope, example, or exception, 
philosophical occlusion and unfamiliarity with experiences of disability 
bespeaks entrenched failures of reflexivity at the level of both theory and 
praxis—a result of the normalizing effects of visibilization, of sedimentation 
of the intertwining, ambiguous interplay of the visible and invisible, sense and 
sensibility. Ableism, whether cast in the veneer of attitudes natural or critical, 
renders such results when it functions to underwrite the ableist conflation 
and devolves inquiry with collective aspirations into inquiry of privileged 
production. For the values and worlds it will provision and proffer, we need 
the non-philosophy of non-normate phenomenology.
Joel Michael Reynolds 
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